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Dramatic events in Eastern Europe manifest an ongoing world political-economic 
realignment of singular importance to American food and agricultural industries. These 
unfolding changes hold greater long-run significance for U.S. agriculture in the 1990s and 
beyond than does the new farm bill and are potentially more significant than the GATI 
negotiations. This essay highlights world reordering and its implications for U.S. agriculture. 
A Changing World Order 
Since the close of the second world war, the international order has been defined 
largely in terms of two major military-economic-political blocs - NATO and the OCED in 
the west and the Warsaw Pact and COMECON countries in the east. Over the past several 
years, major changes have been occurring in each bloc. These changes in large part 
represent loss in. economic performance as a result of over-extension by each of the major 
bloc superpowers, the U.S. and the USSR, and a growing recognition by each of economic 
limits to the exercise of world military domination. 
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Three seminal changes characterize the breakdown of the old order and the 
emergence of a new international political-economic order. 
1. Disillusionment with Communism as a viable option for serving the aspirations 
of society, not only in the COMECON countries but throughout much of the 
third world as well. 
2. Within the Western alliance, the formation of three economic superpowers 
or blocs bent on international economic competition. 
3. A general recognition in both blocs that world power and prestige in a techno-
scientific age derive from economic rather than military prowess. 
Disillusionment with Communism 
Failure of Communism as a viable political-economic alternative is the single most 
visible evidence of the demise of the old international economic order. In fact, 
Communism has been failing for a long time. Marxism early on was thought to be 
monolithic and irreversible. Yugoslavia first and China later dispelled that notion. The 
depth of disillusionment with Communism and the rapidity with which it is abandoned when 
military control is relaxed is illustrated by recent events in eastern Europe. 
Even if the turn of eastern Europe toward democratic capitalism and away from 
totalitarian socialism is reversed by tanks as in China, pressures for change will remain to 
reemerge later as centrally planned economies fall ever farther behind other systems in 
serving fundamental human yearnings for dignity, a standard of living comparable to that 
in developed market economies, and freedom of choice. A system with no pot of gold at 
the end of its rainbow also is a less attractive alternative to democratic-capitalism in the 
third world. 
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Three Emerging Economic Superblocs 
While the east bloc is breaking up out of economic weakness, three economic 
superblocs or superpowers have emerged out of the west bloc: (a) Japan, (b) the U.S. (and 
Canada under the free trade agreement), and (c) the EC-12. A milestone for the latter will 
be major progress toward elimination of border restrictions among members by the end of 
1992. Success of the EC-12 could lead to formation of other economic blocs or an 
expansion of the three economic superpowers into larger trading blocs by incorporating 
other countries. 
Japan as the smallest economic superpower is especially vulnerable to a European 
bloc augmented in size, economic power, and protectionism. The seemingly natural free 
trade area comprised of Japan, China, Taiwan, and Korea and perhaps stretched to 
. 
southeast Asia is beyond reach because of lingering colonial and World War II legacies. 
Meanwhile, the search for an enlarged free trade area by the United States and Canada 
could encompass Mexico, Australia, and New Zealand. 
Furthermore, the size of these three economic superpowers will energize other 
countries to develop their economies and is likely to spark renewed interest in large-scale 
trading blocs. Mental gymnastics can easily carve the world into innumerable permutations 
of a new international economic order. Second and third world countries such as Brazil, 
India, China, and the Soviet Union are notably missing from the above scenarios. Each 
singly or in cooperation with other countries has the potential to be a major global player 
in the geopolitical-economic game. Despite some progress, these countries currently seem 
unwilling to make the institutional reforms required for superpower status in the new 
international economic order. 
The Eastern European economic community is unlikely to survive to constitute a 
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fourth major economic power bloc. Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary will turn to the 
West -- to democratic socialism if not capitalism and attain associate status with the 
European Free Trade Association in the Common Market. East Germany could go the 
same route, but, more likely, will find reunification with West Germany irresistible. 
The road to western democratic capitalism in the east bloc will be longer and 
rougher than many anticipate. Political reform will get ahead of economic reform, 
threatening the reform process because pent up aspirations for political freedom and 
economic progress can easily outrun economic reality. Development of entrepreneurial and 
managerial skills and the work ethic takes time, even if central planning and other 
impediments to a market are fully removed -- and they will not be. In historic perspective, 
socialism in the form of central planning and state ownership of the means of production 
has not been compatible with political democracy. 
The road to integration of eastern Europe into the global financial community also 
will not be smooth. To be sure, gaining most-favored-nation status and membership in the 
GAIT, IMF, and World Bank need be no problem. But in several countries unrealistic 
aspirations will energize the Economic Degradation Process (see Tweeten,AJAE, December 
1989) characterized by living beyond ones means, inflation, overvalued (nonconvertible) 
currency, and balance of payments shortfalls. The economic problems of the general 
economy will be shared by agriculture. Faced with such difficulties, some countries of 
eastern Europe, while attempting to pursue the Swedish model of the welfare state and 
capitalistic private industry, are likely to revert to a state of economic stagnation somewhere 
between democratic capitalism and totalitarian socialism -- which we label the Yugoslavian 
model. 
At any rate, rebuilding of the eastern portion of the "common European home" will 
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consume much of the capital and political energy of western Europe to the year 2000 and 
perhaps beyond. That gives the U.S. some breathing room but could lead eventually to an 
even stronger and more competitive European economy. 
While renovating southern and eastern Europe will provide a generous Keynesian 
stimulus helping to maintain full employment in Europe and elsewhere, it will make the 
goal of a "United States of Europe" without internal borders more elusive. With the fading 
of the common enemy (USSR), the heterogeneity of the new "western" Europe and the 
prominence of a united Germany will work against full political and economic union in 
Europe. 
From Military to Economic Confrontation in the 1990s 
A likely consideration in the USSR allowing eastern Europe to go its own way is the 
recognition that a first-class military, with its dependence on high technology and costly 
weapons, cannot be sustained by a second-class economy. A corollary is the growing 
recognition that world influence and prestige are based more on economic than on military 
power. Additionally, much of the general public and many leaders of the major nuclear 
powers view war among their nations as unthinkable, while at the same time economic 
turmoil in the Communist countries has lessened the immediate threat of global military 
conflict. Nevertheless, the French revolution remains a sobering reminder that breakup of 
the old order even in an atmosphere of good intentions and high ideals can lead 
unpredictably to violence and chaos. 
A current quip is that after over four decades of cold war between the United States 
and the Soviet Union, the winners have finally emerged: Japan and Germany. By stressing 
savings, technological excellence, trade, and human resource development rather than 
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military might, Japan and West Germany have become major world players in the economic 
sphere despite relatively small populations and few natural resources. Meanwhile, global 
military overreach has contributed to the relative decline of the resource-rich Soviet and 
American economies. 
Japan spends three times as many public dollars on agricultural research per dollar 
of output as the U.S. In 1988, Japan spent $3.4 billion while the U.S. spent only $2.3 
billion on computer chip research and development, despite the importance of the effort 
to the $300 billion U.S. electronics industry (Time, December 4, 1989, p. 68). Despite a 
population of only one-half the U.S., Japan equals the United States in numbers of 
scientists and engineers (The Economist, December 2, 1989, p. 4 of "Survey"). In short, 
Japan and Germany build better automobiles and consumer electronics in part because they 
devote little sdence, engineering, and industrial resources to the military. 
The new order of three or more techno-economic power centers means more entities 
possessing wherewithal for seminal breakthroughs in cold or hot nuclear fusion, · 
superconductivity, genetic engineering, and a host of other technologies that can raise living 
standards worldwide. This technological critical mass is likely to increase economic 
competition among these three economic superpowers and any other economic blocs that 
emerge. 
The U.S. Legacy of the 1980s 
While we find it refreshing that perhaps for the first time in history protagonists 
are not girding for possible military conflict, superpowers bent on competing economically 
rather than militarily is not all good news for the U.S. Policies of the 1980s have not 
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readied the U.S. to meet world-class economic competition in the new international 
economic order. To be sure, the U.S. remains the world's premier economic power and 
possesses a basically sound political-economic r.;ystem. However, the nation has been 
weakened by economic policies that will burden the future: a dilapidated infrastructure, 
financial institution bailout costs, a troubled elementary and secondary public school system, 
inadequate provision for retirement needs of the baby-boom generation, environmental 
clean-up and other costs yet to be internalized, huge domestic and foreign debt, and neglect 
of civilian science and technology. 
A large debt incurred to build a productive capital base would not constitute a 
burden to future generations because a dividend to provide a better quality of life would 
remain after repaying principal plus interest. For the most part, America's foreign debt of 
some $600 billion has not financed a productive capital base but instead has been used to 
finance consumption. Recent studies provide compelling evidence that real net U.S. 
investment has been hurt rather than helped by foreign debt (see Jon Faust, "U.S. foreign 
indebtedness: Are we investing what we borrow?" in Economic Review, Kansas City Federal 
Reserve, July/ August 1989). Our debtor status has already constrained our options to 
shape developments in Eastern Europe and elsewhere. Meanwhile, West Germany and 
Japan have options and the economic power to shape these developments. 
Responding to the accumulated IOUs of the U.S. economy will be complicated by 
several factors including a low savings rate, public distrust of science and technology arising 
from environmental problems and fear of rapid technological change, further transformation 
to a slow-growth service economy, and low birth rates. Services, now accounting for three-
fourths of the economy, are less cyclical than manufacturing but are also less amendable 
to productivity advances. Growth in real GNP per capita dropped from an average annual 
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rate of 2.5 percent in the 1960s to 1.7 in the 1970s and 1.8 percent in the 1980s. 
Responding to IOUs listed earlier suggests even slower growth in the 1990s and beyond. 
Implications for U.S. Agriculture 
We now turn to implications for American agriculture of the new international 
economic order. The following predictions assume that the U.S. will conduct agricultural 
policy to help right its fiscal house and pursues other policies for global competitiveness in 
the new international economic order: 
Ea.stem Europe Implications 
* The role of Eastern Europe in the new international economic order holds 
the most uncertainty, and thus the implications for U.S. agriculture in this 
region are also uncertain. Dislocations from restructuring east bloc economies 
likely will disrupt their food production for the short run, leading to sizable 
. 
concessional food imports. The U.S. will share with Western Europe in this 
food aid trade. 
* The eventual outcomes of the economic restructuring depend on how much 
consumption has been subsidized, how much lack of incentives have 
constrained agricultural production, and to what extent agricultural production 
has been directed to sub-marginal areas that would not be competitive under 
free markets. Nevertheless, the mix of farm output and food consumed will 
shift as market determined prices and incomes become more important in 
determining what is produced and purchased. 
* Currently, excluding Germany and Czechoslovakia, eastern European 
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countries show lower food consumption levels than counterpart countries in 
the EC at comparable latitudes, especially for livestock products and vegetable 
oils. In contrast, they consume more cereals (see table). 
But income levels are not perceived to be sufficient to support even this level 
of consumption at free market prices. Thus, unless incomes and food aid 
grow rapidly, consumption levels are likely to decline in the short run. 
In the long run, as incomes rise some expansion in consumption can be 
expected. The northern tier of eastern European countries show greater 
levels of livestock product consumption than the southern tier of countries, 
but lower agricultural self-sufficiency, especially in cereals (see table). 
Feedgrain and oilseed exports to these countries are possible. 
In the southern tier of eastern European countries, consumptions levels are 
lower, especially in livestock products (see table 1). Grain production is 
generally adequate to support larger livestock production. But, in the short 
run, some livestock product exports may be possible to this region. 
The provision of food supplies to the USSR from COMECON countries is 
likely to decline, as is already happening in Romania. This, along with the 
need to meet rising food consumption aspirations in the USSR will lead to 
continued strong exports from the U.S. to the USSR. 
Significant potential especially in the short and medium term, exists for 
exports to Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R. of modern agricultural inputs, 
such as fertilizer and pesticides, and modern food processing technology. 
Western Europe will garner most of this trade, but opportunities exist for U.S. 
businesses. 
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* In the longer run, restructuring of the eastern bloc away from collective 
farming, central planning, and general food subsidies and toward economic 
incentives, access to improved inputs, privatization, and greater efficiency 
could decrease dependence on food imports. Eastern European countries. 
have considerable natural and human resources to expand food production 
given needed technological, structural, and incentive changes. The closer the 
east bloc is incorporated into the European Community, the more generous 
will be farm production incentives, thus displacing U.S. exports. Better 
processing technology and improved storage infrastructure should reduce post-
harvest waste. In the unlikely case of sharply rising real incomes made 
possible by economic reform, food demand could outrun domestic supply, 
generating food imports if farm and food prices are allowed to be at world 
levels. 
Other Implications 
* An enlarged European Community to include the east bloc could generate 
a crisis as production is expanded in response to higher prices. On the one 
hand, surpluses could lead to additional subsidized exports and trade wars. 
On the other hand, the higher cost of the CAP in terms of subsidies and 
indirect costs of higher food prices and hence in wages making nonfarm 
industrial products less competitive could lead to liberalizing trade and 
commodity program reform. Similar pressure for international 
competitiveness in Japan and other high farm support countries could energize 
international trade and commodity program liberalization. The direction 
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taken by economic superpowers facing such crossroads will have a maJOr 
impact on American agriculture. 
While trade skirmishes will be frequent among economic superpowers, 
diversified wants of affluent nations will not be satisfied from domestic 
production and will heighten the importance of international trade. Self-
sufficiency will not lose its allure but pressures for economic progress and 
overall competitiveness will constrain interventions protecting domestic 
agriculture. An economic alliance between any two of the three superpowers 
could win concessions from the third power. 
A "peace dividend" from reduced military expenditures could be used to 
reduce the federal deficit and rebuild U.S. infrastructure (including 
education). U.S. agriculture will benefit from a modest reduction in real 
interest rates and a better transportation system. The lower interest rates and 
attendant lower dollar and requirements for servicing international debt can 
stimulate U.S. farm exports. 
Continuing pressure to meet social and infrastructure needs and maintain 
fiscal responsibility necessary to compete economically in the new 
international order will bring careful scrutiny of upper- and middle-class 
welfare programs. Expensive direct payment programs to farmers will not be 
sustainable. Food security will remain a concern but policies will attempt to 
stabilize food supplies at lower real cost than under past commodity programs. 
Mandatory supply control commodity programs insulating U.S. farmers from 
international markets seem out of the question because of the need for 
competitiveness and foreign exchange. 
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The need for the U.S. farm sector to be economically competitive in the 
export market will place increased emphasis on reducing production costs. 
This emphasis will be reinforced by rising domestic real labor and 
environmental compliance costs. Production will be geared toward maximum 
economic profits subject to environmental constraints. Production-oriented 
economic research will be much in demand. 
It will make sense to redirect federal resources from paying farmers not to 
produce to paying for research, extension, and education required for 
improved technology and international competitiveness. Additional public 
resources for science made available from reduced military expenditures and 
from other sources will be essential for an efficient, sustainable agriculture 
providing safe and abundant food supplies in the face of world-class 
competition and environmental constraints. 
The U.S. will be able to substitute economic for some military aid to third 
world countries as the threat of Marxist revolution diminishes. Our 
agriculture will benefit to the extent that economic progress expands foreign 
demand for our grain and meat exports faster than production growth in 
third-world countries. Further, debt alleviation would expand third-world 
growth opportunities, increasing incomes and imports of food. 
Conclusion 
Adaptation of the American economy to the competitive new international economic 
order will entail sacrifice and opportunities. Some sectors of agriculture protected from 
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economic realities by commodity programs and trade barriers will face difficult adjustments. 
On the whole, however, a world more driven by economic competition than by military 
confrontation will be better for American agriculture and for consumers and producers 
worldwide. 
Table 1. Food Consumption Levels And Agricultural Self-Sufficiency 
Eastern Europe, U.S.S.R., Western Europe, and the U.S. - 1985. 
Annual food consumption in tons of Agricultural self-
cereal eguivalents ner canita - 1985 Sufficiencv - 1980-85 
Country All Livestock Veg. 
or Region Food Cereals Products Oils All Cereals Livestock 
(percent) 
Eastern Europe 1.78 .18 1.35 .03 92 87 99 
Poland 1.73 .20 1.34 .02 95 88 100 
Eastern Germany 2.32 .15 1.92 .04 91 80 101 
Czechoslovakia 1.98 .15 1.65 .03 98 97 101 
Hungary 1.76 .15 1.44 .03 124 112 122 
Rumania 1.33 .19 .95 .04 105 100 109 
Yugoslavia 1.38 .22 1.01 .04 95 96 101 
Bulgaria 1.60 .21 1.19 .05 103 100 111 
USSR 1.79 .18 1.34 .04 89 84 96 
Western Europe 1.80 .12 1.45 .05 97 103 103 
West Germany 2.00 .10 1.69 .04 92 94 102 
Austria 1.93 .09 1.63 .06 104 112 106 
Italy 1.79 .16 1.44 .07 79 60 80 
United States 2.20 .09 1.82 .08 122 157 99 
NOTE: Cereal equivalents express all food-related agricullllral production and use in terms of primmy food calorie 
value indexed to cereals. For example, livestock products are ei:pressed in terms of grain equil'alem of all feeds used 
in production. Selfsufficiency is determined by dividing domestic food-related agricultural use by domestic food-related 
agriculmral production. Data are adapted from FAO food balance data. 
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